Tu quoque, the Economist,…; actualización política para liberales, 6.

Todos saben que aunque este emocionalmente comprometido con mi colectivo político, y sus devenires menudos; nunca deje de tener un ojo en lo que sucede fuera de la Argentina.

Porque, a pesar de no ser parte del Mundo, estamos en el Mundo; y este, tarde o temprano, nos afectara.

No soy economista, ni geopolítico; solo un militante estándar peronista, generacionalmente setentista, pero NyC (Nacido y Criado).

Aunque lo último, a 65 años de su génesis, parezca un dato menor, no lo es.

Porque nos permitió conocer, antes del gran aluvión de Sectores Medios, a los fundadores; con sus orígenes y tradiciones diversas, lo laborioso que fue construir una identidad y generar una Contracultura.

Como colectivo social, que desborda lo estrictamente político partidario, hemos pasado por diferentes transformaciones y metamorfosis; los no Peronistas hablan de 3, 5, 7, o 9 peronismos.

Suelo utilizar el concepto hinduista de Avatar, para explicar las sucesivas reencarnaciones, que en el fondo no son más que respuestas exitosas a diferentes desafíos, en el sentido que le da Arnold Toynbee.

Los NyC solemos plantear que en el peronismo no hay beneficio de Inventario, ni hacia adentro, ni hacia el resto del Pueblo Argentino, los quejosos no P.

Somos Perón, Evita, Borlenghi, Carrillo, Campora, Espejo, Cook, Patricio Kelly, Vandor, Rucci, el Brujo, el tordo Miguel, Ubaldini, Firmenich, Cafiero, Menem, Chacho Álvarez, Herminio, Grosso, Duhalde, Reutemann. de la Sota, Kunkel, Rico, Kirchner, Barrionuevo, Moyano, y todos los que alguna vez en su vida dijeron públicamente que eran peronistas.

Pero también somos, Tamboríni, Mosca, Sanmartino, Balbín, Frondizi, los Ghioldi, Codovilla, Hardoy, Leonardi, Rojas, Aramburu, Santucho, Moreno, Videla, Massera, Galtieri, Martínez de Hoz, Palacios, Alfonsin, Cavallo, los Alzogaray, Macri, Binner, Grondona, Joaquin Morales Sola, Bonasso, Carrio, Cobos, López Murphy, Buzzi, De Angelis, Yasky; y todos aquellos que ni en pedo se asumirían; pero conforman “nuestra” circunstancia.

¿Y que es uno sin su circunstancia?, ¿si además se tiene el celo misionero de hacer prosélitos?

Nunca fuimos un tenedor libre, sino un comedor comunitario donde hay plato único, un guiso compuesto por lo aporta cada compañero; y el “hambre” te lleva a pasar el pan sobre el plato, para pedir otra ración.

Porque a pesar de las diferencias, sentimos que compartimos una “unidad de destino”; juntos llegamos a Balcarce 50, o juntos compartiremos la parrilla y la fosa.

Porque no es un problema ideológico, sino de pura praxis, y la situación que se ocupa en ese momento preciso.

Oscar Smith era todo lo contrario a un zurdo infiltrado, y sin embargo la circunstancia lo obligo a resistir exitosamente al Proceso; porque encabezaba, según Walsh, una organización reivindicativa de calidad superior.

Tachuela Duhalde no es un revolucionario chavista, pero en Abril de 2004 con Carmona, solo él y el barba Fidel salieron con los tapones de punta.

Mientras Bush, Blair y Aznar aplaudían, y los progresismos latinoamericanos y europeos dudaban.

Hay que leer las notas de Pagina 12, o El País, de esas fechas; donde connotados chavistas de hoy en día, miraban con cariño la participación de los camaradas de Acción Democrática de Carlos Andrés Pérez en la expulsión del “populismo”, y la recuperación de la Republica.

Perón se canso de señalar que uno “monta los acontecimientos”, inevitablemente; y que el estudio y compenetración con la realidad, es lo que te permite “desensillar hasta que aclare”, justamente para evitar que te desmonten por la imprevisión.

Ahora bien, Perón se murió y no esta, pero quedan sus métodos de estudio y comprensión.

¿Qué significa eso?

Nuestra definición de enemigo NO es la de Carl Schmitt; es más cercana a la de Bonaparte en Italia, o Mao durante los 30 y 40, o el VC en las 1º y 2º guerras Indochinas.

"- Soldados...!

Estáis mal vestidos, y mal alimentados.

El gobierno espera mucho de vosotros y no os da nada...

Vuestra paciencia y coraje al soportarlo son dignas de admiración, pero no os proporcionan gloria.

Yo os conduciré a los valles más fértiles del mundo, ricas provincias y grandes ciudades estarán a vuestro alcance...

Las conquistaréis, obtendréis riquezas, honor y gloria...

Soldados de Italia...!

¿Cuanto vais a esperar...?"

Traducido a porteño, el enemigo es un recurso material y dialéctico.

Pero para poder “ganarlo”, no ganar o vencer, sino ganarlo; debo conocerlo, estudiarlo, encontrar sus virtudes y defectos; sobreponiéndome a mis prejuicios y aversiones, para que la CURIOSIDAD pueda trabajar a todo su potencial.

Solo los pedantes y necios son capaces de desconocer su Poder disolvente.

Por eso; la Clase Política y el Mainstream económico viven en Babia; discuten como si no hubiera sucedido el 2001; y ni siquiera leen la prensa de divulgación económica.

The Economist no puede ser acusado de Populista, y mucho menos de criptoestatista; pero el editorial, sumado a los artículos específicos, es lo mas parecido a una Autocrítica marxista realizada por un vocero del Liberalismo anglo sajón.

Francia, y el papel del Estado Burocrático activo; Alemania, y los riesgos de la dependencia de las exportaciones como motor económico, España y el desempleo, en un país con una legislación sumamente flexible, a la que se le exige mas flexibilidad; el Reino Unido y el 30ª aniversario del thatcherismo, el fracaso del Social liberalismo y su 3ª vía, el dilema de la impopularidad de los métodos de la Dama de Hierro, y la manera que los Conservadores se hacen los distraídos volviendo a ¡Disraeli! y su Conservadurismo Progresista e Imperial.

“The 30th anniversary of the Iron Lady’s first general-election win in May 1979 has been marked by reports, often exultant, of the death of Thatcherism.

None of us is a Thatcherite now.

Mr Cameron is a different sort of Tory: less of an economic determinist than Mrs Thatcher, more socially liberal, more in the party’s “one nation” tradition”

Si los párrafos anteriores no son el reconocimiento de una bancarrota ideológica, ¿como los llamamos?

Por eso le planteo a los Compañeros, Amigos y Críticos; ojo con paco ideológico, no compren paquetes llave en mano, que pueden explotarle a los incautos.

No tener idea no es vergonzoso, estamos tan en bolas como los que mandan en la City, WS, o el Distrito de Columbia.

Se quemaron los libretos;

“But the global economic meltdown has given them the satisfying triple whammy of exposing the risks in deregulation, giving the state a more important role and (best of all) laying low les Anglo-Saxons.

……………..

On the continental side, there is nothing especially socially cohesive about labour laws that favour insiders over outsiders, or rules that make the costs of starting a business excessive.

Even Colbert might admit that Europe’s tax burdens are too onerous today, particularly since they are likely to have to rise in the future to meet the looming cost of the continent’s rapidly ageing populations.

For the liberals, even if the cycle swings back in their direction, the financial crisis and the recession have shown up defects in the way they too implemented their model.

Getting regulation right matters as much as freeing up markets; an efficient public sector may count as much as an efficient private one; public investment in transport, schools and health care, done well, can pay dividends”.

¿Se entiende?, son discusiones que ni hay quedar, solo remitirlos a los papaers e informes que se están generando AHORA.

¿Cómo va a ser nuestro nuevo avatar peronista?

Eso depende de nosotros, y los amigos y críticos de buena leche que quieran acompañarnos.

Porque en el fondo, los no P, esperan que cumplamos con ese principio Doctrinario que dice:

“The pecking order may change, but pragmatism and efficiency will always count”

The Economist, and the Bases. ;-P

Tu quoque, the Economist,…; actualización política para liberales, 5

Unemployment in Spain

Not working

May 7th 2009 | MADRID
From The Economist print edition

Spain is experiencing Europe’s worst unemployment problem

THE huge signs are up in town squares, city parks and myriad spots where men in overalls dig holes, lay pavements or spruce up public facilities. They proclaim that the work is being paid for by Plan E, the stimulus package pushed through by Spain’s Socialist prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. This included €8 billion ($11 billion) for immediate spending by town halls.

Plan E was meant to keep Spaniards working. Yet the latest unemployment figures show that it is not enough. In April 40,000 more people joined the dole queues. That was a slower rise than in previous months, but it still leaves Spain with a 17.4% unemployment rate, the highest in the European Union and twice the EU average. The European Commission predicts that unemployment will hit 20.5% next year. It also says Spain will struggle longer than other countries to recover, getting into positive growth only in 2011, a full year after the EU as a whole. “The sick man of Europe” was how the pro-government El País newspaper greeted the news.

Perhaps the most worrying thing is that Plan E has, in part, worked. The government says it has created some 280,000 jobs, even if few are permanent. The effect is temporary, said Pablo Vázquez of the Foundation for Applied Economic Studies. In August and September unemployment may climb again. Spain is lucky that strong social networks (helped by the black economy) help to prevent civil unrest.

The economy is in a double bind. It has been engulfed, like the rest of the world, by recession and shrinking global trade. To this is added Spain’s own particular crisis, as a model based on cheap labour and a dizzy property market hits the skids. Economists say that Spain must now make the sacrifices and take the tough decisions that it avoided during the long boom years.

Labour-market reform is perhaps the toughest of all. In some ways Spain’s labour laws are quite flexible. With almost a third of the workforce on temporary contracts, marginal workers are easy to shed by the simple expedient of not renewing contracts. That explains why Spain accounts for over half the additional unemployment within the euro area in the past year. The rest of the workforce is on Teflon-coated permanent contracts that make people difficult and expensive to sack. Companies inevitably choose staff to shed on the basis of how easy they are to fire.

Almost everyone favours reform. Such an initiative is urgently needed, with the government leading it, said a group of 95 academic economists in a letter. Mr Zapatero, however, does not share their sense of urgency. And labour-market reforms are not all that he is shying away from. The Bank of Spain recently issued a warning about a dwindling pension pot, suggesting it was time to push the retirement age above 65. Liberalisation of services provided by everyone from notaries and lawyers to veterinarians would help the recovery, said José Carlos Diez of Intermoney, a consultancy. “Whenever we have had a liberalisation plan, the economy has shown its potential for growth,” he added.

So why does Mr Zapatero not reform? Besides all the usual worries about strikes, trade unions and public support, his main problem lies in parliament. Last month his minority government lost its first parliamentary vote. Although the Socialists are only seven seats short of an absolute majority, they are struggling to find allies. Basque nationalist deputies are angry that a Socialist, Patxi Lopez, has just become their region’s premier. Catalan nationalists are similarly tired of the Socialist-led administration in their region. A fractious group of left-wing parties is not always reliable and unlikely to back tough reforms.

That leaves the main opposition, the conservative People’s Party, which now leads in the opinion polls. Some Spaniards would like to see the two big parties push a reform agenda through together. Things will have to get much worse before they are ready to do that.

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13611650

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Tu quoque, the Economist,…; actualización política para liberales, 4

Bagehot

There is no alternative

May 7th 2009
From The Economist print edition

The permanence of Thatcherism and the politics of unpopularity

POLITICS has turned funereal. New Labour was buried by ululating commentators after last month’s flawed budget. Now the -ism that spawned Tony Blair’s hybrid creed is apparently following it into oblivion. The 30th anniversary of the Iron Lady’s first general-election win in May 1979 has been marked by reports, often exultant, of the death of Thatcherism.

There are two strands to this diagnosis. One is that Margaret Thatcher’s deregulatory reforms, in particular the “Big Bang” of 1986, caused the financial crash; in this critique Mrs Thatcher (as she was in office) personally dispensed bankers’ bonuses from her handbag. The wider point is that the economic model she advocated, and which her apostate Labour successors embraced, has been discredited. Neo-liberal, Thatcherite economics, runs this argument, was fatally undermined by its own internal weaknesses, then interred after the crunch amid a mêlée of Keynesian splurges and nationalisations. None of us is a Thatcherite now.

The first charge is true only in the way that, say, the Versailles treaty “caused” the second world war. There have been too many intervening years, factors and governments for the case to stand up—though it reflects Mrs Thatcher’s mythic status that, for some, she must be to blame. The wider argument is plain wrong. The themes of British politics in the next few years will be recognisably Thatcherite. So will many of the policies.

Conviction and confusion

One nostalgic motif may be confrontation with trade unions. Of course, they are not the destructive power in the land that they were in 1979: Mrs Thatcher saw to that. Their membership has shrunk; their leaders are saner. All the same, the squeeze on pay and pensions in the public sector that may be needed to help cut Britain’s deficit will doubtless provoke a serious punch-up.

Another is privatisation. Admittedly, the state has temporarily taken charge of the new commanding heights of the economy, the banks. But elsewhere the process of privatisation begun by Mrs Thatcher and furthered by her heirs continues: witness the row between Gordon Brown and Labour MPs over plans for Royal Mail. More importantly, in areas that Mrs Thatcher only nibbled at—health, education and welfare services—politicians will push on with bringing in private provision and applying the rigours of the market to the functions of the state.

Then there is the question of tax. The new top rate of income tax, of 50% for earnings over £150,000 ($225,000), is cited as evidence of Thatcherism’s combustion. Yet the angry response has shown how widespread and ingrained is the doctrine that Mrs Thatcher preached: that low tax is good for both enterprise and government revenues. Moreover, while the latest increase may be myopic, it is scarcely the sort of confiscatory levy imposed before she took over: the realm of the possible in taxation has shrunk. Taxes may rise in the immediate future (as they did after the notorious budget of 1981); but a 1980s-style backlash against over-taxation across the whole spectrum of wealth may well follow. There could be a renewed push for tax reform, shifting the burden, as Mrs Thatcher did, from income tax to other kinds.

Britain is not the place it was in 1979: it is more complex, more tolerant and hedonistic, haunted less by imperial decline than by pseudo-imperial overstretch. Its problems are different too. Thirty years ago, taming inflation and making the country governable were Mrs Thatcher’s first priorities. Now one pressing need is to fulfil an aspiration she never realised: a dramatic reduction in the proportion of national wealth consumed by the state. For all the excitable short-term neo-Keynesianism, the basic long-term solution is Thatcherite: stringent economic discipline.

Imposing that discipline will bring with it two other Thatcher trademarks: controversy and intermittent unpopularity. The atmosphere of politics, like some of its content, is set to be Thatcherite. And Mrs Thatcher’s experience offers her successors a template for the uses and management of opprobrium.

For Mr Brown, the comparison is shaming. Shortly after he moved into Number 10, he invited Mrs Thatcher round for tea, describing them both as “conviction politicians”. Yet whereas her premiership was controversial in pursuit of a transformative goal, his has been a study in purposeless unpopularity.

Meanwhile David Cameron, the current Conservative leader, is in one sense the first post-Thatcherite holder of that office; only now have the clefts in the party left by her ousting healed. Mr Cameron is a different sort of Tory: less of an economic determinist than Mrs Thatcher, more socially liberal, more in the party’s “one nation” tradition. But he has assimilated at least one major lesson of her often misremembered career. She was a revolutionary but also an incrementalist, whose biggest upheavals were mostly not announced in her manifestos.

Mr Cameron is being similarly cautious. He now lauds Mrs Thatcher where once he seemed to distance himself from her, using her name as a byword for political bravery—but without saying precisely what form his own bravery will take. His Tory colleagues talk about how loathed they expect to be after six months in government—but not exactly why. The outstanding question is this: for all the shortage of upfront details, Mrs Thatcher knew what she wanted to achieve. Do the Cameroons?

At a recent press conference Mr Cameron was asked about the Thatcher anniversary. Serendipitously, as he answered, a military band struck up outside the window; Mr Cameron clenched his fist and talked with mock bombast about giving “pride back to Britain”. He is of a generation for whom invisible, ironising inverted commas hang above any grand or portentous statement. They didn’t for Mrs Thatcher. Her lesson is that Mr Cameron needs to know his mission, stick to it and hold his nerve.

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13610705

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Tu quoque, the Economist,…; actualización política para liberales, 3

Germany's economy

The export model sputters

May 7th 2009 | BERLIN
From The Economist print edition

The German habit of relying on export-led growth comes under fire

IT HAD been purring along nicely, handling the twists and turns of the world economy, powering past rivals, inspiring envy. But in recession Germany’s export-led model is sputtering more than most. The European Commission now expects German output to shrink by 5.4% this year, compared with a 4% drop in the European Union overall; the German government predicts a 6% plunge. Most of the contraction will be in exports.

Countries with similar models are thinking of trading them in. It is “no longer realistic to hope that Japan’s growth can come back just by exporting the same products,” the Japanese prime minister, Taro Aso, told Handelsblatt newspaper. Philipp Hildebrand, president of Switzerland’s central bank, expressed similar doubts. Germany’s economic press is peppered with articles asserting that the country “needs a new business model”.

Most German leaders disagree. The two main parties in the grand coalition, Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), are sniping before the federal election in September, but they are united in believing that exports must remain the foundation of German prosperity. Germany, unlike other rich countries, has avoided deindustrialisation, they point out. With a rapidly ageing population, it is also right to accumulate savings by running a current-account surplus. Its scant natural resources and tradition of openness point the economy towards trade. Besides, Germany just isn’t that into services, which have displaced industry in other countries.

This model could now change in one of three ways. The government could pursue an industrial policy that favoured production for the home market. To most Germans that would seem bizarre, though there is scope for creating service jobs in education or care for the elderly. Or the government could promote consumption by keeping fiscal policy relatively loose. But given German allergy to debt that is unlikely. Or change could come through a slowdown in world trade and a correction of international imbalances. This seems by far the most likely course. Germany will not deliberately surrender its position as the world’s top exporter of goods, says Bert Rürup, a former head of the government’s committee of economic “wise men” now at AWD Holding, a financial-advice firm. But its current-account surplus may fall as profligates like the United States and Britain consume less and export more.

Germany is export champion largely because it has done many things right. After losing competitiveness for years, industry clawed it back by holding down wage rises and shifting some production abroad. Germany now has “the lowest increase in unit labour costs of all its main trading partners,” says Mr Rürup. The previous SPD-Green coalition sought to reduce joblessness by trimming unemployment benefits and deregulating the labour market. Its successor has slashed the budget deficit, partly by increasing value-added tax by three points. German consumers stayed thrifty as consumers from San Sebastián to San Francisco binged on debt.

The result of this self-restraint was that exports soared in real terms, whereas consumer spending barely budged (see chart). Between 2004 and 2007 net exports accounted for 60% of growth. Germany’s current-account surplus reached a hefty 6% of GDP last year, irritating its trading partners within the euro area, which have been unwilling to hold down wages but can no longer resort to devaluation. Rather like China and Japan, virtuous Germany has made its living out of the overindulgence of others.

That was not a worry when times were good, but it is now. Exports will fall by nearly 19% this year, according to government forecasters. Germany’s debt-free households, by contrast, will cut spending by just 0.1%. The export-led recession has hurt its most prosperous regions and better-paid workers, which may be one reason why the public outcry has been muted. But recovery will not be quick. Some international trade “will disappear forever,” says Marek Belka, director of the IMF’s European department. Vehicles, machinery and chemicals account for nearly two-thirds of exports, a narrow base for the prosperity of the world’s fourth-largest economy. Vehicle manufacturing is highly vulnerable. Too many factories and workers are making too many cars globally; Germany will surely be forced to close down some production.

When recovery comes, consumption is likely to play a bigger part than exports. By 2013, net exports will account for 3.25% of GDP, down from 6.3% in 2008, says a forecast by eight economic institutes. Consumer spending, meanwhile, will rise from 56.3% of GDP to 57.75%. This shift will occur amid sluggish growth and lower employment: the trend rate of growth between 2008 and 2013 will be 0.9%, compared with average growth of 1.5% in 1995-2008, say the institutes.

Do not expect the government to encourage the change, however. Even as they battle to save carmakers like Opel, the German arm of General Motors, politicians dream of the world champions that may replace them. The SPD’s campaign programme rhapsodises about “climate and environmental technology” in which Germany supposedly has a competitive edge. IW Consult, part of the business-friendly Cologne Institute of the German Economy, thinks the growth industries will be pharmaceuticals, measurement technology and business services.

A government worried that growth is skewed towards exports could redress the balance by cutting taxes or raising spending. Dirk Schumacher, an economist at Goldman Sachs, says that the rise in VAT was a “big policy mistake” that squeezed consumption and also helped to undermine support for further economic reforms. He thinks the government should give low- and middle-income earners extra tax relief, even after the economy starts to recover. Ms Merkel may yield to pressure from the CDU’s liberal wing to make this the centrepiece of her election platform.

In the end, fiscal prudence will win out. The contraction of GDP plus the government’s two fiscal-stimulus packages will push the budget from balance in 2008 to a deficit of nearly 6% of GDP in 2010. The next government is likely to want to pare that back. Both governing parties back an amendment to the constitution to bar the federal government from running big deficits in most circumstances (and state governments from incurring any at all) after 2016. Tax will not be cut as a share of GDP, predicts Mr Rürup. The title of export champion may have lost its glitter, but Germany will not give it up lightly.

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=13611300

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